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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS 
AT MURFREESBORO 
 
ESTATE OF CLARENCE       
TURNAGE,                                        
) 
 ) 
Docket No.: 2017-05-0963 
Employee,  )  
And )  
EJT, NRT, and SMT,  ) State File No.: 58603-2017 
Employee’s minor )  
children, )  
v. )  
DOLE REFRIGERATING CO., INC., ) Judge Dale Tipps 
Employer.  )  
 
 
COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER 
 
  
This matter came before the Court on January 17, 2019, for a Compensation 
Hearing.  The central issue is whether two of Clarence Turnage’s biological children, 
Noah and Sarah, are entitled to death benefits.  For the reasons below, the Court holds 
that they are not. 
 
History of Claim 
 
The parties stipulated a number of facts at the hearing: 
 Mr. Turnage died on August 3, 2017, from injuries that arose out of and in the 
course and scope of his job at Dole Refrigerating. 
 Mr. Turnage’s average weekly wage was $640.92. 
 At the time of his death, Mr. Turnage was unmarried, but he lived with Megan 
Black and their minor son, Elijah. 
 Before living with Ms. Black, Mr. Turnage fathered two children, Noah and Sarah, 
with Michelle Jewett. 
 Mr. Turnage and Ms. Jewett’s parental rights were terminated when Mr. Turnage’s 
mother, Deborah Dean, adopted Noah and Sarah in 2012.  Noah and Sarah are 
minors. 
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 Elijah is entitled to benefits as a “wholly dependent” child under Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 50-6-210(a)(2). 
 
At the hearing, Ms. Dean testified about adopting Noah and Sarah.  The children 
were living in Florida with both parents when their mother left the home and Mr. Turnage 
went to prison.  As a result, the state placed Noah and Sarah in foster care.  To keep the 
children together, Ms. Dean and Mr. Turnage agreed she should adopt them, and she 
brought the children to live with her in Tennessee.  As a result of the adoption, the State 
of Florida pays Ms. Dean $834.00 per month for the benefit of the children.  She also 
receives $284.00 in Social Security benefits per month per child. 
 
 Mr. Turnage left prison a few months after the adoption and returned to 
Tennessee.  The children continued to reside with Ms. Dean, but they usually stayed with 
Mr. Turnage and Ms. Black on weekends, holidays, and most of summer vacation.  Ms. 
Dean described a close and loving relationship between Mr. Turnage and the children. 
 
 When asked if Mr. Turnage provided any support other than food when the 
children stayed with him, Ms. Dean said that he would buy some of their clothes, school 
supplies, and toys when he had money.  He also claimed the children as exemptions on 
his income tax and shared a portion of his tax refunds with her.  However, Ms. Dean 
admitted that Mr. Turnage did not provide any significant amount of financial support for 
the children.   
 
In early 2017, Ms. Dean and Mr. Turnage had a disagreement.  As a result, he had 
no contact with the children for the last four months of his life, and he failed to share that 
year’s tax refund with Ms. Dean. 
 
Ms. Black testified that Mr. Turnage moved in with her after he returned to 
Tennessee in 2012, and they had Elijah the next year.  They lived together as a family 
until Mr. Turnage’s death.  Ms. Black confirmed that Noah and Sarah spent most 
weekends, summers, and holidays with her and Mr. Turnage, which she estimated to be 
about one-third of every year.
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The guardian ad litem for Noah and Sarah contended that they meet the statutory 
definition of “wholly dependent.”  Therefore, they are entitled to a full share of survivor 
benefits.  
 
Elijah’s guardian ad litem argued that because the adoption terminated Mr. 
Turnage’s parental rights, Noah and Sarah are not entitled to benefits under the Workers’ 
Compensation Law.  In the alternative, he contended that the children were only partially 
                                                 
1
 In her response to Requests for Admissions, Ms. Black suggested that the children stayed with Mr. 
Turnage approximately 170 days per year. 
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dependent and thus entitled to a smaller share of benefits than Elijah. 
 
Dole echoed Elijah’s argument, contending that Noah and Sarah are not entitled to 
any benefits because they failed to meet the statutory definition of “dependents.” 
 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
 
The following legal principles govern this case.  Noah and Sarah have the burden 
of proof on all essential elements of their claim.  Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, 
2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Aug. 18, 2015).  This means they must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that they are, in fact, entitled to the 
requested benefits.  Willis v. All Staff, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 42, at *18 
(Nov. 9, 2015); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6) (“[T]he employee shall bear 
the burden of proving each and every element of the claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”). 
 
Death Benefits 
 
The Workers Compensation Law provides several ways in which a child might be 
entitled to death benefits.  One of these is Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
210(a), which provides that a child under sixteen years of age “shall be conclusively 
presumed to be wholly dependent.”  The parties agree that Elijah meets this definition 
and is entitled to benefits.  The first question for the Court is whether Noah and Sarah 
also fit into this category. 
 
The problem for Noah and Sarah is that they are Mr. Turnage’s biological 
offspring but they were not his legal children at the time of his death.  Instead, as the 
Final Judgment of Adoption notes, Mr. Turnage’s parental rights were terminated by 
court order.  Noah and Sarah were the legal children of Ms. Dean.  Thus, they do not fit 
the obvious technical meaning of “child” as it is used in section 50-6-210(a).2  The Court 
therefore cannot conclusively presume them to be wholly dependent. 
 
Noah and Sarah disagree, relying on Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co., 530 S.W.2d 
283 (Tenn. 1975), and Stamps v. Trinity Marine Prods., Inc., 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 184 
(Tenn. Workers Comp. Panel March 22, 2016).  The Williams Court held, “A stepchild, 
who is a member of the employee’s family and is dependent upon the employee for 
support, is a dependent child within the ambit of protection of the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act and is entitled to share benefits equally with an actual child of the 
deceased employee.”  Id. at 285.  Noah and Sarah contend that if a stepchild can qualify 
as a dependent, then they should, too. 
 
                                                 
2
 That is, although Noah is still a child, he is not Mr. Turnage’s child. 
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Up to a point, Noah and Sarah are correct – children may qualify for benefits even 
if their legal relationship to the decedent is not simple or clear.  However, their reliance 
on Williams is misplaced insofar as they seek to rely on the conclusive presumption of 
“wholly dependent” found in section 50-6-210(a).  The stepchild in Williams received 
benefits on the trial court’s finding that he was actually dependent on Mr. Williams at the 
time of his death.  In other words, the Court did not apply the conclusive presumption but 
noted, “Relationship is not the test, but support and actual dependency of the child.”  Id.3 
 
Further, Mr. Turnage’s use of Noah and Sarah as exemptions on his federal 
income tax returns is not determinative because he had no legal relationship with them, 
provided informal and limited support, and kept them in his home less than half of each 
year.  Further, although they cited Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations, 
Noah and Sarah produced no authority that those definitions of “qualifying child” or 
“custodial parent” are binding on the Court.  The Court also notes that Mr. Turnage 
would not appear to qualify as a claiming or custodial parent under the cited regulations. 
 
Having determined Noah and Sarah are not presumed to be dependent, the next 
issue is whether they are entitled to benefits because of actual dependency.  There are two 
possible paths to this result.  The first, section 50-6-210(c), provides that certain relatives 
of the deceased
4
 shall be considered an actual dependent if they “were wholly supported 
by the deceased employee at the time of death and for a reasonable period of time 
immediately prior to the time of death.”  This section is inapplicable because Mr. 
Turnage never “wholly supported” Noah and Sarah once Ms. Dean adopted them. 
 
The other means of entitlement to benefits is found in section 50-6-210(d), which 
provides: 
 
Any member of a class named in subsection (c) who regularly 
derived part of the member's support from the wages of the deceased 
employee at the time of death and for a reasonable period of time 
immediately prior to the time of death shall be considered a partial 
dependent, and payment of compensation shall be made to the dependents 
in the order named. 
 
 Dole and Elijah contended that, because Noah and Sarah were no longer Mr. 
Turnage’s legal children, they were not members of the “class named in subsection (c).”  
The Court disagrees.  As has already been noted, Williams and Stamps make it clear that 
dependent stepchildren may receive benefits, even though the decedent had no legal duty 
to support them.  This situation seems analogous to those cases.  Further, because Ms. 
                                                 
3
 Similarly, the Panel in Stamps held that the stepchild would be entitled to seek benefits if he were able 
to prove actual dependency under section 50-6-210(c) or (d).  Stamps, at *10. 
4
 Wife, husband, child, mother, father, grandparent, sister, brother, mother-in-law, or father-in-law. 
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Dean adopted the children, they became, legally, Mr. Turnage’s brother and sister.  Thus, 
if they met the other requirements of this section, they would be entitled to survivor 
benefits.  However, the Court cannot find they met these other conditions. 
 
The problem is that Mr. Turnage had no contact with the children for the last four 
months of his life and provided no support during that period.  Nor was there any 
evidence as to when or if he might resume that support.  This does not meet the statutory 
requirements that Noah and Sarah “derive[d] part of their support” from Mr. Turnage’s 
wages “at the time of his death.”  Further, the children received no support from Mr. 
Turnage for the preceding several months, which the Court finds to be “a reasonable 
period of time immediately prior to the time of death.”  Unfortunately, as both of these 
conditions are required by section 50-6-210(d), the failure to meet either one is fatal to 
Noah and Sarah’s claim.  They do not meet the definition of partial dependents. 
 
 The Court notes that even if Noah and Sarah had successfully established partial 
dependency, they still failed to meet their burden of proving “all essential elements of 
their claim.”  The missing element arises out of Section 50-6-210(e)(9), which provides 
that partial dependents: 
 
shall be entitled to receive only that proportion of the benefits provided for 
actual dependents that the average amount of the wages regularly 
contributed by the deceased to the partial dependent at the time of, and for a 
reasonable time immediately prior to, the injury, bore to the total income of 
the dependent during the same time. 
 
Mr. Turnage provided some level of contribution by feeding the children and 
occasionally purchasing items for them when they visited.  However, the parties 
submitted no evidence as to the amounts spent, the value of those contributions, or the 
amounts he gave Ms. Dean from his tax refunds, much less any proof of the proportion of 
those expenditures to Mr. Turnage’s total income.  Further, this calculation suffers from 
the same problem as before – the statute requires the calculation to be based upon the 
time of the work injury “and for a reasonable time immediately prior.”  As noted above, 
Mr. Turnage’s failure to provide any support for a substantial period before his death 
makes this calculation impossible, or at least impermissibly speculative. 
  
Therefore, this Court concludes that Noah and Sarah failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that they are entitled to any Workers’ Compensation 
benefits arising out of Mr. Turnage’s death.   
 
Elijah established the presumption of dependency and is thus entitled to weekly 
benefits of 50% of Mr. Turnage’s average weekly wage under Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 50-6-210(e)(5).  Based on the parties’ stipulation, this compensation 
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rate is $320.46 per week. 
 
Attorney Fees 
 
 Both guardians ad litem indicated that they intend to seek payment of their fees 
under Rule 17.03 of the Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure.  However, both attorneys 
asked that the Court postpone their requests until after issuing the Compensation Hearing 
Order.  They explained that they would not have a full accounting of the time spent on 
this matter until after the hearing and any post-hearing matters are concluded.  The Court 
finds this request reasonable.  The Court further notes that Ms. Black’s attorney did not 
indicate whether he intended to seek a fee.  Therefore, the Court will address the issue of 
fees at a later date.   
 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows: 
 
1. Noah and Sarah Turnage’s claims against Dole Refrigeration Co. and its workers’ 
compensation carrier are dismissed with prejudice against their refiling. 
  
2. Dole Refrigeration Co. shall pay Elijah Turnage death benefits in the amount of 
$320.46 per week until he is no longer eligible for benefits under Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 50-6-210(e)(11).  Payment of benefits shall be deferred until 
after the Court determines whether Ms. Black’s attorney is entitled to any fees 
and, if so, to what extent the benefits must be commuted. 
 
3. Counsel seeking fees must file their fee requests and supporting documentation 
within fifteen days of this order becoming final.  Any party opposing such a 
request shall have an additional ten days to file a response. 
 
4. Costs of $150.00 are assessed against Dole Refrigeration Co. under Tennessee 
Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-21-.07, to be paid to the Court Clerk 
within five days of this order becoming final. 
 
5. Dole Refrigeration Co. shall prepare and file a statistical data form (SD2) within 
ten business days of the date of this order under Tennessee Code Annotated 
section 50-6-244. 
 
6. Absent an appeal, this Order shall become final in thirty days. 
 
ENTERED this the 4
th
 day of February, 2019. 
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_____________________________________  
    Judge Dale Tipps 
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Exhibits 
 
1. Dole’s responses to requests for admissions 
2. Ms. Black’s responses to requests for admissions 
3. Ms. Dean’s responses to requests for admissions 
4. Transcript of Ms. Dean’s deposition 
5. Transcript of Ms. Black’s deposition 
6. Collective exhibits submitted by Noah and Sarah Turnage 
7. Elijah Turnage’s birth certificate 
 
Technical Record: 
 
1. Petition for Benefit Determination 
2. Post-Discovery Dispute Certification Notice 
3. Orders appointing guardians ad litem 
4. Noah and Sarah Turnage’s Exhibit and Witness List 
5. Dole Refrigeration’s Exhibit and Witness List 
6. Noah and Sarah Turnage’s Pre-Hearing Statement 
7. Elijah Turnage’s Pre-Hearing Statement 
8. Dole’s Compensation Hearing Brief 
9. Elijah Turnage’s Prehearing Brief 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the Compensation Hearing Order was sent 
to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 4th day of 
February, 2019. 
 
 
Name Certified 
Mail 
Via 
Fax 
Via 
Email 
Service sent to: 
Connor Sestak, attorney 
for Dole Refrigerating 
Co., Inc. 
  X csestak@morganaikins.com  
David Goodman, attorney 
for Megan Black 
  X dgoodman@forthepeople.com  
R. Steven Waldron, 
guardian ad litem for NRT 
and SMT 
  X arlenesmith@comcast.net  
Richard Matthews, 
guardian ad litem for EJT 
  X Rmatthews95@aol.com  
 
  
 
  
 
______________________________________ 
              PENNY SHRUM, COURT CLERK 
       wc.courtclerk@tn.gov 
II 
I 
Compensation Hearing Order Right to Appeal: 
'I 
If you disagree with this Compensation Hearing Order, you may appeal to the Workers' 
Compensation Appeals Board or the Tennessee Supreme Court. To appeal to the Workers' 
Compensation Appeals Board, you must: 
1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: "Compensation Hearing Notice of Appeal," and file 
the form with the Clerk of the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims within thirty 
calendar days of the date the compensation hearing order was filed. When filing the 
Notice of Appeal, you must serve a copy upon the opposing party (or attorney, if 
represented). 
2. You must pay, via check, money order, or credit card, a $75.00 filing fee within ten 
calendar days after filing of the Notice of Appeal. Payments can be made in-person at 
any Bureau office or by U.S. mail, hand-delivery, or other delivery service. In the 
alternative, you may file an Affidavit of Indigency (form available on the Bureau's 
website or any Bureau office) seeking a waiver ofthe filing fee. You must file the fully-
completed Affidavit of Indigency within ten calendar days of filing the Notice of 
Appeal. Failure to timely pay the filing fee or file the Affidavit of lndigency will 
result in dismissal of your appeal. 
3~ You bear the responsibility of ensuring a complete record on appeal. You may request 
from the court clerk the audio recording of the hearing for a $25.00 fee. A licensed court 
reporter must prepare a transcript and file it with the court clerk within fifteen calendar 
days of the filing the Notice of Appeal. Alternatively, you may file a statement of the 
evidence prepared jointly by both parties within fifteen calendar days of the filing of the 
Notice of Appeal. The statement of the evidence must convey a complete and accurate 
account of the hearing. The Workers' Compensation Judge must approve the statement 
of the evidence before -the record is submitted to the Appeals Board. If the Appeals 
Board is called upon to review testimony or other proof concerning factual matters, the 
absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence can be a significant obstacle to 
meaningful appellate review. 
4. After the Workers' Compensation Judge approves the record and the court clerk transmits 
it to the Appeals Board, a docketing notice will be sent to the parties. The appealing 
party has fifteen calendar days after the date of that notice to submit a brief to the 
Appeals Board. See the Practices and Procedures of the Workers' Compensation 
Appeals Board. 
To appeal your case directly to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the Compensation Hearing 
Order must be final and you must comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. If neither party timely files an appeal with the Appeals Board, the trial court's 
Order will become final by operation of law thirty calendar days after entry. See Tenn. 
Code Ann.§ 50-6-239(c)(7). 
For self-represented litigants: Help from an Ombudsman is available at 800-332-2667. 


II 
' 
Tennessee Bureau of Workers' Compensation 
220 French Landing Drive, 1-B 
Nashville, TN 37243-1002 
800-332-2667 
AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY 
I, , having been duly sworn according to law, make oath that 
because of my poverty, I am unable to bear the costs of this appeal and request that the filing fee to appeal be 
waived. The following facts support my poverty. 
1. Full Name: ______ _____ _ 2. Address: - ------------
3. Telephone Number: - - ------- 4. Date of Birth:-----------
5. Names and Ages of All Dependents: 
----------------- Relationship: -------------
----------------- Relationship: -------------
----------------- Relationship: -------------
---------------- - Relationship:-------------
6. I am employed by: - - ---------------------------
My employer's address is:-------------------------
My employer's phone number is: -----------------------
7. My present monthly household income, after federal income and social security taxes are deducted, is: 
$ ______ _ 
8. I receive or expect to receive money from the following sources: 
AFDC $ per month beginning 
SSI $ per month beginning 
Retirement $ per month beginning 
Disability $ per month beginning 
Unemployment $ per month beginning 
Worker's Camp.$ per month beginning 
Other $ per month beginning 
LB-1108 (REV 11/15) RDA 11082 
I. 
I 
9. My expenses are: ! ~ 
' 
Rent/House Payment $ 
Groceries $ 
Electricity $ 
Water $ 
Gas $ 
Transportation $ 
Car $ 
per month 
per month 
per month 
per month 
per month 
per month 
per month 
Med icai/Dental $ 
Telephone $ 
School Supplies $ 
Clothing $ 
Child Care $ 
Child Support $ 
li 
I 
_ ____ per month 
_____ per month 
_ _ ___ per month 
_____ per month 
_____ per month 
_____ per month 
Other $ per month (describe: 
10. Assets: 
Automobile $ ____ _ 
Checking/Savings Acct. $ ____ _ 
House 
Other 
11. My debts are: 
Amount Owed 
$ ___ _ 
$ ____ _ 
To Whom 
(FMV) ----------
(FMV) ----------
Describe: __________ _ 
I hereby declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing answers are true, correct, and complete 
and that I am financially unable to pay the costs of this appeal. 
APPELLANT 
Sworn and subscribed before me, a notary public, this 
____ dayof _____________________ , 20 __ _ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: _______ _ 
LB-1108 (REV 11/15) RDA 11082 
